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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case 
This is an Appeal from the final order on restitution entered by the Honorable Timothy 
Hansen in the District Court of the Fourth Judicial District of the State of Idaho, in and for the 
County of Ada, dated the 10th day of April, 2015 in which Appellant was ordered to pay 
restitution in the amount of $2,640.00, pursuant to the State's Motion for Restitution under LC. 
Section 37-2732(k). 
B. Course of the Proceedings Below 
An Information was filed with Ada County Court on June 13t\ 2013, charging the 
Defendant with a violation of I.C. Section 37-2732(B)(a)(c), Trafficking in Marijuana. R., pp. 
16/218. On June 28t\ 2013, the Defendant entered a plea of Not Guilty to the charge. R., pp. 
18/218. On the 18th day of July, 2013, the Defendant filed a Motion to Suppress all statements 
and evidence obtained as a result of the search and seizure of his person that occurred pursuant to 
a traffic stop for a violation of I.C. Section 49-808(2), alleging that the stop and the subsequent 
search and seizure were conducted in violation of the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments of the 
United States Constitution and Article 1, Section 17 of the Idaho Constitution. R., pp. 24/218. 
After subsequent hearings on the Motion to Suppress, the Honorable Judge Timothy Hansen of 
the District Court of Idaho for the Fourth Judicial District denied the Defendant's Motion to 
Suppress. R., pp. 156-166/218. On or about June 4t\ 2014, Appellant entered a conditional plea 
of guilty reserving his right to appeal the District Court's decision on the Motion to Suppress 
Evidence. R., pp. 178/218 and pp. 174/218. The Appellant has a current appeal before the court 
on the issue of the Motion to Suppress. 
At the Sentencing Hearing on November 5, 2014, the State requested an order for 
restitution. A hearing on the State's request for restitution was held on February 5, 2015. The 
matter was resent for further argument and on February 20, 2015, the Defendant filed an 
objection to the State's request for restitution. A final hearing was held on March 5, 2015, at 
which time the court took the matter under advisement and the Honorable Judge Hansen filed his 
Memorandum Decision and Order on restitution on April 10, 2015. The Appellant now appeals 
from that decision and order. 
C. Statement of the Facts 
The facts as articulated in this Appeal are limited to those pertinent to the Order on 
Restitution only. The State in this case sought an order of restitution in the amount of $7,328.50, 
for attorney time spent prosecuting the Appellant's case, pursuant to LC. Section 37-2372(k). 
Specifically, the State had initially alleged that it spent 25.5 hours prosecuting the case against 
the Appellant, but subsequently revised that amount to 42.3 hours including the time it spent in 
the restitution hearing matters themselves. See Transcript, p. 22/36, line 19. 
The Appellant had objected to the State's request in part arguing that it is unconstitutional 
in that it amounted to a deprivation of the Defendant's right to due process under the United 
States Constitution and his Sixth Amendment right to present a defense under the United States 
Constitution, and as a violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to 
the United States Constitution. 
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The Honorable Judge Hansen entered an order on restitution in the amount of $2,640.00, 
stating that it was proper to include an amount for the restitution hearing itself and for 
preparation of the sentencing hearing, which had not been included in the original accounting of 
time spent. See Transcript, pp. 24/36, for a total time of 35.2 hours spent on the case, at a rate of 
$75.00 per hour. 
I. 
ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
I. IS LC. §37-2372(k) UNCONSTITUTIONAL? 
II. DID THE DISTRICT COURT ERR BY FAILING TO PROPERLY APPLY THE 
LEGAL STANDARDS AS SET FORTH IN I.C. §19-5304(7) WITH REGARD 
TO THE DEFENDANT'S ABILITY TO PAY? 
ARGUMENT 
LC. SECTION 37-2372(k) is unconstitutional in that it in that it results in a 
deprivation of the defendant's right to due process under the United States Constitution 
and his Sixth Amendment right to present a defense under the United States Constitution. 
In addition, its enforcement results in a violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution. 
A. Introduction. 
I.C. §37-2732(k), is a subset of the Uniform Controlled Substances Act of Idaho which 
allows for costs incurred by police agencies for the investigation and to prosecuting attorneys for 
the prosecution of a case under that act. Under this statute, the State sought an order from the 
court for the costs associated with the prosecution of the case, apparently pursuant to an oral 
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motion which was made at the sentencing hearing. The Defendant objected to the order for 
restitution in part on constitutional grounds as articulated below, claiming that it chilled the 
defendant's assertion of his constitutional rights, including a Sixth Amendment right to present a 
defense, by attaching a monetary charge to the length and time it takes to defend the case. 
B. Standard of review. 
The constitutionality of a statute is a question of law which this Court reviews de nova. 
See State v. Cobb, 132 Idaho 195, 969 P.2d 244, 245 (1998); State v. Hansen, 125 Idaho 927, 
930, 877 P.2d 898, 901 (1994). The party challenging the constitutionality of a statute must 
overcome a strong presumption of validity. Cobb, 132 Idaho at 197,969 P.2d at 246. 
C. Argument. 
I.C. §37-2732(k) is a subsection of the Uniform Controlled Substances Act which states, 
"Upon conviction of a felony or misdemeanor violation under this chapter or upon conviction of 
a felony pursuant to the "racketeering act," section 18-7804, Idaho Code, or the money 
laundering and illegal investment provisions of section 18-8201, Idaho Code, the court may 
order restitution for costs incurred by law enforcement agencies in investigating the violation. 
Law enforcement agencies shall include, but not be limited to, the Idaho state police, county and 
city law enforcement agencies, the office of the attorney general and county and city prosecuting 
attorney offices. Costs shall include, but not be limited to, those incurred for the purchase of 
evidence, travel and per diem for law enforcement officers and witnesses throughout the course 
of the investigation, hearings and trials, and any other investigative or prosecution expenses 
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actually incurred, including regular salaries of employees. In the case of reimbursement to the 
Idaho state police, those moneys shall be paid to the Idaho state police for deposit into the drug 
and driving while under the influence enforcement donation fund created in section 57-816, 
Idaho Code. In the case of reimbursement to the office of the attorney general, those moneys 
shall be paid to the general fund. A conviction for the purposes of this section means that the 
person has pled guilty or has been found guilty, notwithstanding the form of the judgment(s) or 
withheld judgment(s)." 
Therefore, while it is referred to as a request for "restitution," it is different from the 
restitution statute in Idaho. Idaho Code § 19-5304, entitled "Compensation for Victims of 
Crimes" is the general restitution statute in Idaho, providing for compensation for economic loss 
for the victims of any person found guilty of any crime under the Idaho State Code. See Id. 
Although LC. §37-2732(k) uses the word "restitution," other states refer to this type of statute 
more properly as one of "recoupment" for the state, because "restitution" is something the law 
allows specifically for the purpose of compensating victims of crimes. 
The statute itself, J.C. §3 7-2732(k), upon which this request is based, is unconstitutional. 
Enforcement of such a statute amounts to a deprivation of the defendant's right to due process 
and to his Sixth Amendment right to present a defense under the United States Constitution. In 
addition, it violates the Equal Protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United 
States Constitution. 
Requiring a Defendant to pay at an hourly rate for the state to prosecute him, when he has 
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the right to require the state to prove the case against him, could result in deterring him from 
asserting rights that may be deemed too costly to pursue. For example, in this case the State is 
requesting additional fees for the time he spent moving the Court to present evidence in the case 
to show there was a valid exception to the warrant requirement when his vehicle was searched. 
The State also is seeking fees for the time he spent asking the Court to release him pending an 
appeal, to review a presentence investigation report, and to provide and research the time spent 
on the case for its restitution request. Knowing he will be required to pay for each stage of the 
process will necessarily result in a chilling effect upon the assertion of his rights. 
Any statute which results in a chilling effect, of a Defendant's constitutional rights is 
deemed unconstitutional, as noted United States v. Jackson, 390 US 570, 390 US 581. In this 
case, the only effect of the statute is to chill the defendant's Sixth Amendment right to assert a 
defense, pursuant to the United States Constitution. In this case, District Court Judge Hansen 
notes that the Jackson court held that if a law has no other purpose or effect than to chill the 
assertion of constitutional rights by penalizing those who chose to exercise them, then that law 
would be patently unconstitutional. See Transcript, page 21/36, lines 15-19. Judge Hansen, in his 
decision, rationalizes that there is in fact a purpose to all restitution statutes because they are 
directed at repaying harm or paying a cost that has resulted from the defendant's crime. See Id, 
page22/36, lines 1-3, citing State v. Wardle, at 137 Idaho 808,811, 53 P. 3d 1227, 1230 (Ct. 
App. 2002) and State v. Breeden, 129 Idaho 813,816,932 P. 2d 939 (Ct. App. 1997). However, 
in both of those cases, restitution was ordered to repay the victims of the crime, pursuant to the 
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general restitution statute in Idaho, Idaho Code Section 19-5304. 
Idaho Code Section 19-5304 is a different statute from the one at hand, and the Appellant 
would concede that the purpose of that statute is to make victims of crimes whole. It is error to 
conflate the two statutes as though they were one since they both use the term "restitution" in 
them. LC. §37-2732(k) does not make victims whole or serve the purposes enumerated in the 
Judge's Memorandum Decision and Order in this case. The only purpose that LC. §37-2732(k) 
serves is to charge a monetary penalty to the Defendant in order to defend their case. The State 
can articulate it as though it is the cost to prosecute the case, but the reality is that the amount of 
money it costs to prosecute a case is entirely dependent upon how long and by what means it 
takes to defend it. If there are constitutional issues at play, as there were in this case, and the 
Defendant wishes to raise those issues, he will be charged money for it. If he wishes to assert his 
Constitutional right to trial by jury, he will have to pay more money for it. Therefore, the only 
effect that this statute has is to chill the assertion of an individual's constitutional rights, and 
therefore, it us patently unconstitutional and a violation of a defendant's right to due process. 
LC. §37-2732(k) also violates the Equal protection Clause, and therefore ought to be held 
invalid. In cases such as James v. Strange, at 407 US 128, 92 S. Ct. 2027, the Court held invalid 
a Kansas statute that required reimbursement of public defender fees in part because it denied 
defendants the benefit of basic indebtor exemptions. The court in that case noted that, "In Rinaldi 
v. Yeager, 384 U.S. 305, 86 S.Ct. 1497, 16 L.Ed.2d 577 (1966), the Court considered a situation 
comparable in some respects to the case at hand. Rinaldi involved a New Jersey statute which 
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required only those indigent defendants who were sentenced to confinement in state institutions 
to reimburse the State the costs of a transcript on appeal. In Rinaldi, as here, a broad ground of 
decision was urged, namely, that the statute unduly burdened an indigent's right to appeal. The 
Court found, however, a different basis for decision, holding that '(t)o fasten a financial burden 
only upon those unsuccessful appellants who are confined in state institutions ... is to make an 
invidious discrimination' in violation of the Equal Protection Clause. Id., at 309, 86 S.Ct., at 
1500." In other words, the Rinaldi case held it was a violation of the Equal Protection clause to 
burden an individual with a debt he cannot repay when he leaves a period of confinement, and 
that it does not serve society's best interest to do so. When Mr. Kelley is released, his ability to 
rehabilitate into the community will be key, and a requirement that he repay thousands of dollars 
to the state would create a huge burden. 
In Fuller v. Oregon, at 417 US 40, 94 S. Ct. 2116, 40 L. Ed. 2d 642 (1974), the Court 
addressed the issue as to whether an Oregon statute that provided for collection of fees from 
defendants who were convicted of a crime for their public defender services who had been 
indigent but later became able to pay, violated the Equal Protection Clause and would result in a 
violation of his right to counsel provided for in the Sixth Amendment of the United States 
Constitution. The Court held that, because the statute only applied to those who later became 
able to pay, it was not like statutes where provisions had no other effect than to chill the assertion 
of constitutional rights by penalizing those who choose to exercise them. Id., at 2125. 
This statute does not apply only to those Defendants who become able to pay; rather, the 
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Defendant's ability to pay is merely one factor the court can look to, and the restitution statute 
explicitly provides that inability to pay cannot be the sole basis for denial of restitution. That 
provision is logical as a requirement of restitution for victims of crimes, as the amount would be 
fixed based upon the suffering of the victim in the case, and not upon the amount of hours spent 
asserting one's constitutional rights. 
D. Conclusion. 
Therefore, the Defendant asserts that I.C. §3 7-2732(k) is patently unconstitutional 
pursuant to the tests articulated in cases such as Jackson and Strange. The cases which have 
addressed recoupment statutes in other states have held that these statutes would be 
unconstitutional if the defendant is assessed to be indigent at the time of enforcement. 
II. The award of restitution pursuant to I.C. § 37-2372(k) for the amount in its entirety 
constituted an abuse of discretion in this case. 
A. Introduction. 
When considering an order restitution requested by the state pursuant to LC. §37-
2732(k), the court is directed to consider the factors delineated in the restitution statute for Idaho, 
I.C. § 19-5304(7) for guidance on the amount of restitution that is proper to order and the amount 
is discretionary for the Trial Court. See State v. Weaver, at WL 3198848 (Id. App. Ct. 2014 ). One 
of these factors is the Defendant's ability to pay, taking into account his financial resources, 
earning capacity and ability of the Defendant, and any other factors the Court deems relevant. 
See I.C. § 19-5304(7). It is the position of the Defendant that, in the Judge's Order, he did not 
take into account those factors or exercise discretion, and merely ordered the amount requested 
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by the State in its entirety, in violation of LC. § 19-5304(7). Furthermore, ordering the amount 
requested in its entirety amounts to a violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the United 
States Constitution. 
B. Standard of review. 
The decision whether to order restitution, and in what amount, is within the discretion of 
a trial court, guided by consideration of the factors set forth in LC. § 19-5304(7) and by the 
policy favoring full compensation to crime victims who suffer economic loss. See State v. 
Weaver, at WL 3198848 (Id. App. Ct. 2014), citing State v. Richmond, 137 Idaho 35, 37, 43 P.3d 
794, 796 (Ct.App.2002); State v. Bybee, 115 Idaho 541, 543, 768 P .2d 804, 806 (Ct.App.1989). 
Thus, the Appellate Court will not overturn an order of restitution unless an abuse of discretion is 
shown. See State v. Weaver, at WL 3198848 (Id. App. Ct. 2014), citing Richmond, 137 Idaho at 
37, 43 P.3d at 796. 
C. Argument. 
As noted in State v. Weaver, "[w]hen a trial court's discretionary decision is reviewed on 
appeal, the appellate court conducts a multi-tiered inquiry to determine: (1) whether the lower 
court correctly perceived the issue as one of discretion; (2) whether the lower court acted within 
the boundaries of such discretion and consistently with any legal standards applicable to the 
specific choices before it; and (3) whether the lower court reached its decision by an exercise of 
reason." Id, citing State v. Hedger, 115 Idaho 598, 600, 768 P.2d 1331, 1333 (1989). In this case, 
the District Court Judge did not engage in this analysis in his decision. 
In the Memorandum Decision and Order, the Judge does indicate that the decision 
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whether to order restitution is within the discretion of the court. See Transcript, pp.19/36, lines 
24-36. However, in the analysis, this appears to be a mere citation of the law by the Judge, 
because there is no analysis to this effect. Therefore, the Appellant would argue that, since he did 
not apply the standards set out in LC. § 19-5304(7), the second prong was not met, i.e., he did not 
act within the bounds of such discretion and properly apply the legal standards applicable to the 
specific choices before it. He did not engage in any discussion as to how the Defendant's 
economic position affected the amount he ordered, if at all. The Appellant had argued that his 
regular occupation was that of a bar tender, with no prospects for future employment, and that he 
would be incarcerated due to this offense for a minimum of one year following the sentencing. 
See Transcript, pp. I 0/36. Instead, the Court simply cites the rule in its decision, that the 
economic status is a factor in consideration of the amount of restitution, although not 
determinative whether to actually award restitution. See Transcript, pp 22/36, lines 12-18. Then 
the Judge makes the summary conclusion that it was proper to award restitution in this case. Id. 
The Appellant argues this is not a sufficient indication that the Jude applied the correct legal 
standards. 
LC. § 19-5304(7), states, "The court, in determining whether to order restitution and the 
amount of such restitution, shall consider the amount of economic loss sustained by the victim as 
a result of the offense, the financial resources, needs and earning ability of the defendant, and 
such other factors as the court deems appropriate. The immediate inability to pay restitution by a 
defendant shall not be, in and of itself, a reason to not order restitution." The decision whether to 
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award it at all is different than exercising discretion and considering the defendant's economic 
status in determining the amount of the award, and while it is true that the statute indicates that 
the Judge should not decide to bar restitution in its entirety due to economic status, the language 
in the statute with regard to consideration of the defendant's economic status would be 
completely unnecessary and made irrelevant if in the next breath it takes away the discretion 
entirely with the language, that "the immediate inability to pay ... shall not be, in and of itself, a 
reason not to order restitution." Why insert the language that the court shall consider the needs 
and earning ability of the defendant if that is to have no bearing on the award? It would make no 
sense. The reason is because the needs and earning ability are prefaced by the language as 
factors to be considered in determining the amount of the restitution. But, as the court later 
states, it is not to be prohibitive of an award itself, a distinction not considered by the Judge in 
this matter. Therefore, the Judge did not properly apply the legal standards in this case, and the 
decision ought to be remanded. 
Furthermore, if the Judge did properly apply the legal standard, and LC. § 19-5304(7) 
actually takes away all discretion based on economic status of the defendant, then the statute is 
clearly in violation of the Equal Protection Clause, and fails to pass constitutional muster, for the 
reasons set forth in the argument in Section I. of this brief. If the Defendant is made to pay 
regardless of his indigent status, then the standards and reasoning the court stated in Rinaldi 
apply here as well, resulting in a financial burden upon and indigent defendant who is unable to 
repay the debt. 
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D. Conclusion. 
The Court in this case ordered the restitution amount the state requested in its entirety, 
making only the adjustment for the approximate amount per hour the state was entitled to. It did 
no, therefore, properly exercise its discretion with regard to the amount of the award itself. It 
ought to have considered the defendant's ability to repay the amount when determining the 
amount to order. Instead, it made a carte blanche determination that the statute indicated that 
economic status is not to be prohibitive of an award. The Court cannot have it both ways: on the 
one hand, asserting that the recoupment statute does not result in constitutional violations due to 
its discretionary nature and then fail to give it any real discretionary effect. 
DATED this 16th day of November, 2015. 
fa'ica B. Bublitz 
Attorney for Defendant/ Appellant 
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